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I.

Introduction and Summary Conclusions

This Report considers whether broadening the personal scope of federal labour
standards could have unintended tax consequences to workers or firms. In particular it
focuses on whether such a change could alter the tax status of certain workers as
independent contractors, transforming them into employees for tax purposes. My brief
conclusion is that in the bulk of cases, widening the net of labour standards to cover some
workers who currently are excluded would be unlikely to affect their status for tax
purposes. It is clear that a worker can maintain dual status, as an employee under labour
standards legislation and an independent contractor for tax purposes. In principle then it
should be possible for a worker to gain the protection of federal labour standards without
losing her tax status as an independent contractor. Indeed amending the definition of
“employee” in Part III of the Canada Labour Code (the “Code”) could serve to underline
the distinct purposes of tax and labour standards regimes, reinforcing the argument that
individuals may have different standing under each.
At the same time, the potential for unintended tax consequences cannot be
entirely ruled out.

In contrast to labour law, tax jurisprudence has not broadened the

concept of employment to encompass hybrid situations like the dependent contractor.
Rather, tax law maintains the traditional binary distinction between employment and selfemployment. In cases where it is difficult to draw the line, a worker’s rights under labour
law may be considered as a relevant factor in determining how they should be
characterized for tax purposes. This factor appears to be gaining importance in a new
line of tax cases that gives more weight to the expressed intentions of the parties as to the
character of their relationship, including their intention to contract out of employment
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standards. That is, there is a trend in some recent tax cases toward granting independent
contractor status to workers who forgo labour law protections in favour of higher pay and
greater job mobility. By implication, workers who enjoy labour law protection may be at
a slight disadvantage in establishing they are independent contractors for tax purposes.
The risk of destabilizing the tax status of workers may be heightened by two other
contingencies, both of which are difficult to anticipate with any precision. The first has
to do with second order effects, that is, whether reforming labour standards might cause
changes of behaviour such that certain workers begin to look more like conventional
employees in terms of how they are paid, and the kinds of supervision to which they are
subject. The second is whether extending labour standards might indirectly stimulate
new enforcement activity by revenue authorities, for example if more workers attempt to
claim EI, which in turn leads to closer scrutiny of tax returns and payroll remittances.
The Report concludes that while these risks cannot be discounted entirely they are
unlikely to materialize in any more than a small percentage of cases. As such it would be
unfortunate if the Commission was deterred by tax considerations from recommending
otherwise desirable changes to federal labour standards. Any problems that may arise are
rooted in an outdated tax statute that has failed to keep up with the blurring of
employment and self-employment in contemporary labour markets. These issues should
be addressed directly through tax reforms (which are beyond the Commission’s
mandate), and not by thwarting the progress of labour standards legislation. However in
choosing among different possible definitions of “employee”, the Commission may wish
to consider which is least likely to cause unintended tax consequences. The Report
concludes that from this perspective, the best definition would be one that is clearly
distinct from the tax law definition, in its language, objectives and scope.
The body of the Report is structured as follows:
•

Part II briefly explains the principal tax consequences of being
characterized as an employee versus an independent contractor, and why
workers and firms usually regard the latter as more advantageous.

•

Part III examines the definition of employment in tax law including the
traditional legal tests, and recent cases which appear to give more attention
to the worker’s status under labour law.
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•

Part IV considers the three alternative definitions of employment being
considered in the context of your review, and compares them to the
definition in tax law.

•

Part V draws on all of the above to analyze the risks that a worker may
inadvertently lose status as an independent contractor for tax purposes if
they are reclassified as an employee for purposes of the Code, and
proposes strategies for reducing any such risks.

II.

Tax Consequences of Shifting from Contractor to Employee Status:
Defining the Downside Risk

This Report will ultimately conclude that adopting a broader definition of
“employee” under Part III of the Code would carry a small risk of unintended tax
consequences, in that some workers who have been treated as independent contractors for
tax purposes may conceivably as a direct or indirect result of such a change be
recharacterized as employees by tax authorities. The purpose of this section is to explain
briefly why such a recharacterization, if it occurred, would significantly affect a worker’s
liabilities and compliance responsibilities under income tax, payroll tax and GST
legislation. While employees do enjoy certain tax benefits, especially the lack of any
GST liability, independent contractor status is generally regarded as more advantageous
from an overall tax perspective. 1 Indeed tax incentives often are the driving factor in
decisions to hire independent contractors rather than employees. 2

1

For a more exhaustive discussion of these tax implications see Alain Gaucher, “A Worker’s Status as
Employee or Independent Contractor”, in Report of Proceedings of the Fifty-first Tax Conference, 1999
Tax Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2000) 33:1-98. See also Philip Friedlan,
“Employee vs. Independent Contractor vs. Personal Services Corporation – A Review and Update”, in
1997 Ontario Tax Conference Proceedings (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1997); and Joanne E.
Magee, “Whose Business Is It? Employees Versus Independent Contractors” (1997) 45: 3 Canadian Tax
Journal 584.
2
See for example FBC, “Be a contractor; pay less tax” (April 2005), online at
http://www.fbc.ca/Keep_Current/Articles/articles05170502.asp.
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A.

Income Tax

Canada’s income tax regime is based on a “source concept of income” adopted
from British law. 3 Under this system income is understood to derive from one of several
discrete sources with each being subject to different rules as to what is included in
taxable income, what can be deducted, and the time at which receipts and expenses are
recognized for tax purposes. Independent contractors (also known as “self-employed”
individuals) are considered to earn income from business, which is taxed quite differently
from employment income. 4 The two most significant differences relate to 1.
deductibility of expenses; and 2. administrative arrangements for payment of tax. 5

1.

Deductibility of Expenses

A chief attraction of independent contractor status is that taxpayers generally are
permitted to deduct all reasonable expenses incurred for the purpose of producing
business income. 6 In computing employment income, by contrast, taxpayers can deduct
3

See Peter Hogg, Joanne Magee and Jinyan Li, Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law, 5th ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 2005), section 4.3. The source concept of income is reflected in section 3(a) of the Income Tax
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supplement), as am. (hereinafter the “ITA”), which defines a taxpayer’s
“income” to include “the total of all amounts…from a source inside or outside Canada”, and section 4
which requires income or loss from each source to be computed separately.
4
The detailed rules for determining net employment income are set out in Part I, Division B, subdivision a
of the ITA (sections 5-8). Net income from business is computed according to the rules in Part I, Division
B, subdivision b of the ITA (sections 9-37). Each of the provinces and territories imposes its own personal
income tax which is payable in addition to amounts owing under the federal ITA. All jurisdictions except
Quebec use the definition of taxable income in the federal ITA to define their tax base, including the rules
for computing business and employment income. Quebec’s Taxation Act, R.S.Q. c.I-3 does not incorporate
ITA provisions by reference but closely tracks the source concept of income used in the ITA (see especially
ss. 28 and 29 of the Taxation Act, which are analagous to ITA ss. 3 and 4). Quebec’s rules for computing
net income from employment or from carrying on business in Quebec are broadly similar though not
identical to those in the ITA (see Taxation Act, Book III, Title II on employment income, and Book III,
Title III on income from business).
5
A further issue that affects cross-border employment situations is that international tax treaties distinguish
between employment and business income, and generally give the source country (i.e. the country where
services are performed) greater leeway to tax the former than the latter: see Hogg, Magee and Li, supra,
section 5.2.
6
Income from a business is defined as the “profit” therefrom, referring to the net income realized after
deducting overhead expenses (ITA s.9, 65302 BC Ltd). It is not necessary to show a causal relationship
between an expense and an item of income, but only that the expense was incurred for an income earning
purpose, and not for a personal purpose (ITA s.18(1)(a), (h); case?), and only to the extent “reasonable”
(s.67). A variety of conditions and restrictions apply to specific items such as, for example, entertainment,
food and beverage expenses which are limited to 50% of reasonable expenditures (s.67.1).
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only those limited items which are expressly allowed in the ITA. 7

The operating

assumption is that employees have a limited need to deduct work-related expenses
because the employer typically bears responsibility for overhead costs. Yet the reality of
current (if not past) labour relations is that employees are often required to contribute to
overhead costs by paying for items such as uniforms, tools, equipment, educational
literature or training programs, cellular phones, job related travel, or maintaining a home
office.

In many cases employees are not permitted to deduct such out-of-pocket costs,

though they are clearly work related and would be deductible to an independent
contractor. The ability to deduct more expenses is thus a key incentive for workers to
characterize themselves as independent contractors where possible. Firms will also find
this beneficial if they can share in the tax savings by compensating their workers at lower
rates.
A few examples serve to illustrate why employees are disadvantaged when it
comes to deducting expenses. First, employees are almost never permitted to deduct the
cost of capital items such as equipment and tools, whereas independent contractors can
claim a percentage of such costs each year under the ITA’s capital cost allowance rules. 8
Employees have sometimes attempted to fit such costs under a provision which allows
them to deduct “the cost of supplies…consumed directly in the performance of the duties
of …employment.” 9 However this language has been interpreted narrowly to include
only items which are used up or worn out in a short time. It has been held not to include
longer lasting assets such as tools, computer hardware, books, or uniforms. 10 Recently
7

ITA s.8(2).
ITA s.20(1)(a). The rates of capital cost allowance for different classes of capital property are prescribed
in the Regulations under the ITA (see esp. Part XI and Schedule II to the Regulations). Employees can
claim capital cost allowance in only a few narrow circumstances where they are required by their
employment contract to purchase a musical instrument, a car used for regular job-related travel, or an
aircraft that is required for work-related travel: ITA ss.8(1)(j),(p).
9
ITA s.8(1)(i)(iii). Note the employer must certify that the employee is required by contract to supply and
pay for such items: s. 8(10).
10
See for example Luks (No.2) v. MNR, 58 DTC 1194 (Exch. Ct.) (electrician’s tools), Carson v. MNR, 66
DTC 424 (TAB) (books); Brownlee v. MNR, 78 DTC 1571 (TRB) (uniforms); Ouzilleau v. The Queen, 98
DTC 3410 (TCC) (computers). Additional cases are discussed in David G. Duff, Canadian Income Tax
Law (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2003) at 403-407. See also Canada Revenue Agency, Interpretation
Bulletin IT-352R2, Employee's expenses, including work space in home expenses (April 26, 1994), paras.
9, 10. Note that since 2002 the ITA has permitted one group of employees - apprentice mechanics - to
deduct the cost of tools where the taxpayer spends over $1,000 in a year, or 5% of their income, whichever
is greater: ss.8(1)(r), (6) and (7). Note also that the Conservative government elected in January 2006
promised in its election platform to introduce a Tools Tax Deduction of up to $500 that would be available
8
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some judges have applied a slightly more generous reading, allowing employees to
deduct the cost of special work clothing, a cellular phone, a pager, and up to date
computer software. 11 However these cases were fought by revenue authorities, and are
best seen as limited exceptions to a restrictive rule.
Home offices are another area where independent contractors have a distinct
advantage in claiming expenses. Employees are permitted to deduct “office rent” in
respect of a home office that is required by their employment contract, and meets certain
other conditions. 12 However the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) asserts that this applies
only to employees who rent from a landlord, and that employees who own their homes
cannot deduct any portion of ownership expenses in respect of a home office. 13 In
contrast, independent contractors who own their homes can deduct a percentage of their
mortgage interest, insurance and property tax costs in respect of a home office, as well as
capital cost allowance on furniture, equipment, and other assets.
Other types of expenses which are denied altogether or are more restricted for
employees than for independent contractors include travel expenses, meals, professional
development courses, fees paid to accountants or other professionals, promotional and
client entertainment expenses, and wages paid to assistants. 14
It is important to note that CRA has at least three years to reassess a taxpayer in
respect of a particular year. 15 This means that a worker who has filed income tax returns
as an independent contractor but who is later recharacterized as an employee may have
deductions reversed for up to three previous taxation years, resulting in additional back
taxes being payable with significant interest charges. 16

to both employed and self-employed tradespeople: Conservative Party of Canada, Stand Up For Canada:
Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform 2006, at 17.
11
Fardeau v. Canada, [2002] 3 CTC 2169 (TCC); McCann v. Canada, [2002] 3 CTC 2422 (TCC), at para.
27; Glen v. The Queen, 2004 DTC 2109 (TCC), at para. 11.
12
ITA ss.8(1)(i)(ii), 8(13).
13
See Interpretation Bulletin IT-352R2, paras. 5, 6. The case law is inconsistent but mostly affirms CRA’s
position: see Thompson v. MNR, 89 DTC 5439 (FCTD); Felton v. MNR, 89 DTC 233 (TCC); and Horbay
v. The Queen, 2003 DTC 3950 (TCC). For contrary results favouring employed taxpayers see Prewer v.
MNR, 89 DTC 171 (TCC); and Drobot v. MNR, 87 DTC 371 (TCC).
14
See Gaucher, supra, at 33:8-12. See also Glen, supra note 11 (accountant’s fees); and Emery v. The
Queen, 2003 DTC 4034 (TCC) (assistant’s salary).
15
ITA s.152(3.1),(4).
16
ITA s.161. The interest rate on arrears of tax payable is comprised of a market rate plus a four percent
premium: Regulation 4301(a).
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2.

Administrative Arrangements for Payment of Income Tax

Another attraction of independent contractor status is that business income is not
subject to the source deduction rules under the ITA. The hirer pays a gross amount of
compensation to the contractor, who is responsible to pay quarterly installments of
income tax directly to the government. 17 Employers, on the other hand, must withhold a
prescribed amount of an employee’s wages and remit these funds to the government on
account of the employee’s tax liability for the year. 18 An employer that fails to comply
with the source deduction rules can face heavy interest charges and penalties, for which
corporate directors and officers may be personally liable. 19
Firms most likely would not welcome the additional administrative costs involved
in complying with the source deduction rules. On the other hand the compliance burden
is less for onerous for employees, who need not estimate their net income and tax liability
in advance of the year end, budget for income taxes, or compute and pay installments of
tax to the government.

B.

Payroll Taxes

The federal government imposes two payroll taxes on workers and firms:
Employment Insurance (EI) premiums, and Canada Pension Plan (CPP) contributions.
Independent contractors are not required to pay EI premiums, and are not eligible to
apply for EI when they are out of work. 20 For employees, EI premiums must be paid by
both the employer and the worker. The payment of premiums is administered through
the ITA’s source deduction regime, and failure to pay or remit EI premiums is subject to
the same sorts of penalties and interest charges mentioned above.
Independent contractors do participate in the CPP but are responsible to make all
contributions on their own behalf. 21 By contrast, employers are required to pay a portion

17

ITA s.156, 156.1.
ITA s.153, Reg. 100-108.
19
ITA s.227(8), (8.3), 227.1.
20
See Gaucher, supra, at 33: 19-20.
21
See Gaucher, supra, at 33:20-21.
18
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of their employees’ CPP contributions, and to administer the payment and remittance of
contributions in accordance with the ITA’s source deduction rules.
Note that in contrast to income tax which is payable exclusively by employees out
of their wages, employers share the costs of CPP and EI coverage for their employees.
While employers likely tend to regard these additional payroll costs as disadvantageous,
workers may regard them as beneficial. They may particularly welcome having access to
EI benefits, especially if their jobs are short term or otherwise insecure.

C.

Goods and Services Tax (GST)

A disadvantage of independent contractor status is that GST may be payable on
the worker’s services (unless the worker is a small supplier earning less than $30,000 net
income per year, or is providing certain tax exempt services). If so, the worker is obliged
to collect GST from the hirer (i.e. an additional 7% on top of the amount paid for the
worker’s services), deduct any input tax credits to which the worker is entitled for the
cost of supplies used in performing the work, and remit the balance of GST owing to the
government on a timely basis. In other words the GST itself is paid by the hirer, but the
worker bears the administrative costs of collecting and remitting the tax. 22
Services provided by employees are not subject to GST. From a GST perspective
then, a shift from independent contractor to employee status should be welcomed by
firms and workers alike.

III.

Defining “Employment” in Canadian Taxation Law:
Established Tests and Recent Trends

A.

The Legal Tests

The ITA defines “employment” simply as “the position of an individual in the
service of some other person” and “employee” as a person holding such a position. 23 The
22
23

See Gaucher, supra, at 33:21-22.
Section 248(1).
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Courts have held this definition refers back to the distinctions in common law and civil
law between a contract of service, which establishes an employment relationship, and a
contract for services in which the worker is an independent contractor carrying on
business for her own account. 24 Accordingly the tests used in tax law to determine a
worker’s status are similar to those in other fields such as tort law. Note however that tax
law has never recognized an intermediate category of worker analogous to the dependent
contractor in labour law but has instead maintained the traditional binary distinction
between employee and independent contractor. Judges are quick to acknowledge that a
worker’s status can be ambiguous. But rather than developing new conceptual categories
they have conducted “a balancing operation, weighing up the factors which point in one
direction and balancing them against those pointing in the opposite direction,” 25 to
determine whether in all the circumstances the “total relationship” of the parties is more
like employment, or more like independent contracting.26
The Courts have applied a series of legal tests for determining a worker’s status
while emphasizing that no one test is conclusive by itself. In a typical case the Court will
first apply the so-called “entrepreneur” test, also known as the “fourfold” or more
recently the “four-in-one” test, assessing the parties’ working relationship against the
following criteria:
(i)

control: If the hirer exerts control not only over what work is done, but

the manner in which the worker does it, this points toward an employment relationship.
An independent contractor is assumed to have more autonomy to decide how to complete
the work.

The limitations of this test are well known in that many skilled and

professional employees work without close supervision. While control is therefore not

24

See Wiebe Door Services Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, 87 DTC 5025 (FCA), at 5027 (hereinafter
“Wiebe Door”). This case involving payroll taxes is still considered a leading decision on the distinction
between employees and independent contractors in tax law, as affirmed in Moose Jaw Kinsmen Flying Fins
Inc. v. MNR, 88 DTC 6099 (FCA); and 671122 Ontario Limited v. Sagaz Industries Canada Inc., [2001] 2
SCR 983 (SCC). In Wolf v. Canada, 2002 DTC 6853 the Federal Court of Appeal confirmed that “the
distinction between a contract of employment and a contract for services under the Civil Code of Quebec
can be examined in light of the tests developed through the years both in the civil and in the common law”
(para 49, per Desjardins, JA; see also the reasons of DeCary JA at para.113).
25
P. S. Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (London: Butterworths, 1967), at 38, quoted in
Wiebe Door at 5030.
26
Wiebe Door, at 5030.
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determinative, it was the most important test historically and is still the first factor to be
analyzed in most cases. 27
(ii)

ownership of tools: If the hirer provides the tools or equipment needed to

perform the work this points toward an employment relationship. Conversely, if tools are
supplied by the worker this points toward an independent contract.
(iii)

chance of profit/risk of loss: Here the decision maker considers both the

method of payment for the work, and the extent to which the worker is responsible for
overhead expenses.

A guaranteed rate of remuneration suggests the worker is an

employee. To the extent that a worker can increase her remuneration by working more
efficiently or to a higher standard, or may suffer reduced pay or even losses, this points
toward an independent contracting relationship.
Again, the Courts have stressed that while each of these criteria is important none
is determinative, and the decision maker should focus on “the combined force of the
whole scheme of operations.” 28
The “organization” test (also known as the “integration” test) is frequently applied
in tax cases as a supplement to the multi-pronged “entrepreneur” test just described. As
first articulated by Lord Denning this test provided that “under a contract of service, a
man is employed as part of the business, and his work is done as an integral part of the
business; whereas under a contract for services, his work, although done for the business,
is not integrated into it but is only accessory to it.” 29 The Federal Court of Appeal
cautioned in Wiebe Door that this test should not be used to find an employment
relationship whenever a worker’s services are essential to the hirer’s operations. 30
Observing that mutual dependency is a feature of many work contracts, the Court held
the organization/integration test should rather be applied from the worker’s perspective,
by asking “whose business is it?”, that is whether the worker is in business for her own

27

In Quebec cases this test is often expressed in terms of “subordination” or control of the worker by the
hirer, reflecting the language of the Civil Code of Quebec: see Wolf, supra, at paras. 36, 44; and Vulcain
Alarme Inc. v. Canada, [2000] 1 CTC 48 (FCA).
28
Montreal v. Montreal Locomotive Works Ltd. et al., [1947] 1 DLR 161, per Lord Wright at 169-70,
quoted in Wiebe Door at 5028 and 5029.
29
Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison, Ltd. v. Mac-Donald and Evans, [1952] 1 T.L.R. 101, 111; approved by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Cooperators Insurance Association v. Kearney, [1965] S.C.R. 106.
30
Wiebe Door at 5029.
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account or is performing services as an employee in someone else’s business.31 It is
questionable whether this test adds very much to the analysis or merely restates the initial
question as to the character of the working relationship.

In any event the test is

frequently cited in the reasons for decision in tax cases.
The “entrepreneur” and “organization” tests remain the central legal principles
used by Canadian revenue authorities and Courts to distinguish between employees and
independent contractors for tax purposes. 32

While different decision makers may

interpret and apply them slightly differently from case to case, there is little controversy
about the nature of the tests themselves. 33

B.

The Relevance of A Worker’s Status Under Other Legal Regimes

It is entirely possible for an individual to be characterized as an independent
contractor for tax purposes, while maintaining a different status under labour law or other
legal regimes, such as worker’s compensation, occupational health and safety, or human
rights law. In its published guidelines for distinguishing employees from independent
contractors the CRA does not even mention the worker’s status under other legal regimes
as a relevant factor to be considered. 34 Cases of dual status are virtually unavoidable
given that employment has a range of meanings in different statutory schemes, and
sometimes varies across provinces and territories. 35 Indeed variations in the scope of
coverage, and hence in the definition of employment, are sometimes needed to reflect the
distinct legislative purposes underlying different programs and regimes. An additional
factor in tax cases is the longstanding tendency of the Courts to construe ambiguous tax
31

Ibid. See also Precision Gutters Ltd. v. Canada (2002) 291 NR 161, where the Federal Court of Appeal
issued further cautions about how to apply the organization test correctly.
32
See Canada Revenue Agency, Employee or Self-Employed? (Document No. RC4110(E) Rev. 06). Some
commentators identify the “specified results” test as a further, distinct test of a worker’s status (see for
example Duff, supra, at 198). That is an independent contractor is more often hired to complete specified
work, whereas an employee normally places her services at the disposal of the employer for the duration of
the employment, without a requirement to achieve specified results. However this test is often folded into
the control test.
33
For a thoughtful critique of the legal tests see Lara Friedlander, “What Has Tort Law Got To Do With It?
Distinguishing Between Employees and Independent Contractors in the Federal Income Tax, Employment
Insurance, and Canada Pension Plan Contexts” (2003) 51:4 Canadian Tax Journal 1467.
34
CRA, Employee or Self-Employed? (Document No. RC4110(E) Rev. 06).
35
See Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker and Leah F. Vosko, The Legal Concept of Employment: Marginalizing
Workers (Report for the Law Commission of Canada, October 2002).
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rules in favour of the taxpayer. 36 Thus tax law is prone toward a relatively expansive
definition of independent contractor as this status is generally more favourable to the
taxpayer. By contrast, in labour law and other areas where employment status confers
legal protections, Courts have tended to develop broader definitions of employment over
time. 37 Inevitably, then, a gap has opened up between tax and non-tax definitions of
employment, such that a particular worker may have a different status depending on the
legal context.
Adjudicators are often prepared to tolerate this gap as a practical matter, but
sometimes express discomfort that an individual can switch their status at will to obtain
the most favourable treatment under each statute. For example in Dynamex Canada Ltd.
v. Mamona 38 the Court held that bike couriers could qualify as employees under Part III
of the Code despite filing their taxes as independent contractors. The referee in the case
had commented that,
I remain troubled by the fact that, in arriving at the conclusion (as I now do)
that the Respondents were employees for the purposes of Part III of the
Code, I am allowing them to 'run with the hare and hunt with the hounds',
since they all freely admit that they were fully aware that their contracts
designated them as independent contractors and that, indeed, they were quite
content with that category since it meant fewer deductions at source from
their paycheques. 39
The Federal Court of Appeal held this concern was “relevant but not by itself
determinative…” 40 On occasion a worker’s perceived hypocrisy in claiming dual status
may contribute to an unfavourable decision. In 509023 Alberta Ltd. v. Canada, for
instance, Teskey TCJ held that a worker who had filed tax returns as an independent
contractor could not be considered an employee for EI and CPP purposes, commenting
that “It’s all very well to come to court several years later and say, oh, I was an employee
but she…took advantage of being an independent contractor to write-off her license
fees.” 41 This type of critical remark suggests that while maintaining dual status is in
36

See Lisa Philipps, “The Supreme Court of Canada’s Tax Jurisprudence: What’s Wrong With the Rule of
Law” [2000] 79 Canadian Bar Review 120.
37
See Fudge, Tucker and Vosko, supra, at 51.
38
(2003) 228 DLR (4th) 463 (FCA); leave to appeal denied March 4, 2004.
39
Ibid., quoted at para. 51.
40
at para. 52.
41
[2004] TCJ No. 628 (TCC), para.14.
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principle entirely legitimate, it may provoke a negative reaction from some decision
makers.
A recent line of cases has drawn labour standards into tax jurisprudence in a new
way. As discussed in the next section, these cases suggest that workers who have
contracted out of minimum employment standards may have a stronger case for being
treated as independent contractors for tax purposes.

C.

The Relevance of Express Contractual Terms: Recent Developments

In applying the legal tests described above, CRA and the Courts consider a wide
array of factual details about the parties’ working relationship. In general they have
focused heavily on the de facto conduct of the parties. The Courts have tended to
discount express contractual terms that purport to declare a worker’s status, as these may
not reflect the actual relationship and may be self-serving attempts to achieve favourable
tax results. Significantly, some recent decisions have moderated this stance. Following
the Federal Court of Appeal’s 2002 decision in Wolf, it appears some judges are more
willing to defer to the parties’ expressed desire to avoid the labour law and other
regulations associated with employment status.
The Wolf case dealt with an aerospace engineer who left full-time employment to
work as a consultant, providing services to one firm at a time under contracts of one to
two years duration. The three panel members wrote separate concurring judgments
holding that Wolf was an independent contractor.

All agreed that the evidence

concerning how the work was organized, executed and paid for did not point clearly in
either direction. The decisive factor, expressed somewhat differently in each judgment,
was that the parties had made a conscious decision to trade the security and legal
protections of employment for the lower costs, greater flexibility, and higher cash
remuneration of an independent contract.
Wolf argued that he belonged to a class of temporary or non-standard workers
which is flourishing due to factors such as the globalization of trade, workers’ desire for
increased autonomy, increased competition among firms and a consequent desire to
reduce fixed costs including wages, taxes and the costs of complying with minimum

14

employment standards. 42

Moreover he was described in his express contract as a

consultant and independent contractor. 43 These arguments persuaded all three judges,
though on slightly different grounds. Desjardins JA affirmed the traditional position that
the “terms of the written contract…will only be given weight if they properly reflect the
relationship between the parties,” 44 but accepted that Wolf’s contract created a chance of
profit and/or a risk of loss:
“[i]n consideration for higher pay, the appellant…took all the risks of the
activities he was engaging in.…He had no job security, no union protection,
no educational courses he could attend, no hope for promotion.” 45
...The completion bonus, the absence of health insurance and pension plan,
and the whole risk factor, including the lack of any protection under
provincial labour legislation, favour the status of independent contractor. 46
This interpretation of the worker’s “risk” was novel because it went beyond the chance of
financial profit or loss to consider other factors including job security and the lack of
labour standards protection. In the final analysis, according to Desjardins, JA, “[n]onstandard employment such as the one of the appellant, which emphasizes higher profit
coupled with greater risk, mobility and independence, indicate…the status of
contractor…” 47 This judgment is novel
The other two panel members gave more weight to the parties’ intentions. DeCary
JA’s reasons include the following passages:
…the courts, in their propensity to create artificial legal categories, have
sometimes overlooked the very factor which is the essence of a contractual
relationship, i.e. the intention of the parties…
…We are dealing here with a type of worker who chooses to offer his
services as an independent contractor rather than as an employee and with a
type of enterprise that chooses to hire independent contractors rather than
employees. The worker deliberately sacrifices security for freedom…
In our day and age, when a worker decides to keep his freedom to come in
and out of a contract almost at will, and the hiring person wants to have no
42
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liability towards a worker other than the price of work and when the terms
of the contract and its performance reflect those intentions, the contract
should generally be characterized as a contract for services. If specific
factors have to be identified, I would name lack of job security, disregard for
employee-type benefits, freedom of choice and mobility concerns. 48
Noel JA deferred most explicitly to the contractual terms, stating that,
…this is a case where the characterization which the parties have placed on
their relationship ought to be given great weight…in a close case such as the
present one…the parties’ contractual intent…cannot be disregarded.
…I respectfully agree with my colleagues that the appellant in consideration
for a higher pay gave up many of the benefits which usually accrue to an
employee including job security… 49
The Wolf decision is interesting for purposes of this Report because it draws a new
kind of link between a worker’s tax status and her coverage under employment standards
laws. Wolf was taxed as an independent contractor in part because he had agreed to
forego the protections of labour law. The question is whether this line of thinking could
extend to the reverse situation: if a worker obtains employment standards protection,
does this suggest she has a lower level of “risk” and is therefore more like an employee
for tax purposes? I am not aware of any tax case in which this type of reasoning has
contributed to an employment characterization. However the language in Wolf has been
adopted in subsequent Tax Court of Canada decisions. In Chin v. Canada, Savoie J.
referred to “a new trend in jurisprudence which recognizes new conditions in the market
place where employment standards are no longer the same.” 50 After quoting many of the
above passages from Wolf the Court concluded that Ms. Chin provided English language
teaching services as an independent contractor, not an employee. In Cambrian College v.
Canada, Rip J. found that a day care worker provided services as an independent
contractor. 51 The reasons turned mainly on the entrepreneur and organization tests laid
out in earlier jurisprudence, but also referred to the written contract between the parties
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and Noel JA’s comments in Wolf concerning the importance of “contractual intent” in
determining a workers’ status. 52
The Wolf dicta about “risk” and “contractual intent” appear to be gaining a foothold
in Canadian tax jurisprudence, but it is too soon to tell exactly where this line of cases is
going. If it leads the Courts to make a stronger connection between labour standards and
tax status, then broadening the scope of labour standards could conceivably have
implications for the tax liabilities of some workers. However it must be reiterated that
the Courts have held in other cases that it is possible to maintain dual status for tax and
employment law purposes (see Section III.B. above).

IV. Comparing the Tax Law Definition of Employment to Alternative Labour
Standards Definitions
You have asked me specifically to comment on the extent to which the definition
of “employee” in tax law overlaps or differs with three alternative definitions being
considered in the context of your review of labour standards.

A.

Dependent Contractor
For purposes of this Report I have focused on part (c) of the definition of

“dependent contractor” in Part I of the Code, which refers to,
any…person who, whether or not employed under a contract of
employment, performs work or services for another person on such terms
and conditions that they are, in relation to that other person, in a position of
economic dependence on, and under an obligation to perform duties for, that
other person.
This departs very clearly from the definition of “employment” in tax law in two ways.
First, it specifies that a person can be a dependent contractor whether or not they have
entered a contract of employment as understood at common or civil law. In addition the
concept of “economic dependence” overlaps with, but is likely broader than the legal
tests applied in tax jurisprudence. On my reading “dependence” is not the same as
“control” or “subordination”, which are usually understood to mean the hirer’s right to
determine the time, place and manner in which work is done. Nor is it coterminous with
52
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“ownership of tools” or “chance of profit/risk of loss”. While each of these refers in
some way to the distribution of economic risk between the parties, this differs to my mind
from economic dependence which implies a degree of systemic vulnerability or
inequality on the worker’s part. In other words a worker could be dependent on a
particular firm for her income even though there is significant upside opportunity and
downside risk to how she is paid and what expenses she must cover. The “organization”
test may overlap most with the concept of “economic dependence”, but as noted earlier
the Courts have stated that a relationship of mutual dependence will not by itself satisfy
this test. Instead, the “organization” test should inquire into whether the worker is in
business for herself, or is merely providing services to someone else’s business. Thus
none of the tests in tax jurisprudence occupies quite the same territory, or is quite as
expansive, as the definition of “dependent contractor.”

Of the three alternative

definitions provided this one seems most clearly to go beyond tax law’s concept of
employment.

B.

U.K. Definition
You indicated that some U.K. employment laws extend coverage to “a worker

who undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services for another party to the
contract who is not a client or customer of a profession or business carried on by that
individual.” This definition seems not dissimilar to tests used in tax law to delimit the
concept of employment. It is most reminiscent of the “organization” test in that both ask
whether the worker is carrying on a business for her own account. This question may in
turn implicate other familiar criteria such as whether the worker bears economic risk and
works autonomously. Whether services are performed personally is also a criterion
considered in some Canadian tax cases, usually as an indicator of the hirer’s control over
the worker. Of the three alternative definitions provided, this one overlaps most with
current understandings of employment in Canadian tax law.

C.

Quasi-Subordinate Status
You indicated that quasi-subordinate workers are identified in Italian law on the

basis of three characteristics: continuity, co-ordination and the mainly personal nature of
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the work. For this purpose continuity exists so long as the worker spends considerable
time over the work itself, even if the relationship is temporary. Co-ordination is the
proxy for subordination, indicating that while the worker must comply with the
requirements of the employer, this obligation is not as strong as it would be in a
subordinate relationship. The mainly personal nature of the work excludes services
provided through a corporation or where the worker’s role is limited to directing others
who provide the services.
Like the concept of dependent contractor, this definition overlaps with the
traditional indicators of employment in tax law but also goes beyond it and would likely
cast a wider net that includes more workers. It is semantically distinct from the term
“employment.” The prefix “quasi” suggests it is intended to catch ambiguous or hybrid
relationships that may fall outside of traditional employment. Moreover it does not
appear to refer even indirectly to ownership of tools, chance of profit, or risk of loss.
This suggests that quasi-subordinate status is broad enough to encompass some workers
who from the perspective of tax law look more like independent contractors. This
alternative definition occupies an intermediate position between the first two in terms of
how clearly it can be differentiated from tax law’s traditional understanding of
employment.

V.

Potential Consequences of Extending Federal Labour Standards:
Analyzing the Tax Risk
The question at the heart of this Report is whether enlarging the definition of

employee in Part III of the Code might unintentionally disadvantage affected workers by
rendering them employees for tax purposes as well. As explained in Part II of the Report,
a shift from independent contractor to employee status does carry some tax advantages
(especially relief from GST, access to EI benefits, and a reduced administrative burden
for employees). However many workers and firms would regard such a change as
negative, especially as regards the scope of expenses that can be deducted for income tax
purposes.
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The likelihood of any such consequence occurring depends on at least three
interrelated factors: (i) the extent to which a worker’s labour standards coverage is
considered by tax law to be a relevant factor in determining employment status for tax
purposes; (ii) whether the extension of labour standards might cause behavioural changes
that bring the working relationship more closely into line with tax law’s understanding of
employment; and (iii) whether labour standards reform may trigger new enforcement
activities by revenue authorities, resulting in additional scrutiny and reassessments of
some workers and firms.
These factors are considered in turn below. In each case I conclude there is a low
but not zero risk of unintended tax consequences for particular workers depending on
their individual circumstances.

(i)

As discussed earlier there is no necessary linkage between a worker’s status for

tax and labour law purposes. However tax jurisprudence on the definition of employment
stresses the potential relevance of all surrounding circumstances, and this Report has
provided examples of cases in which a worker’s coverage under labour law or other
statutes has had some bearing on how they are characterized for tax purposes. This may
occur when a decision maker perceives some unfairness in the worker making
inconsistent claims, or conversely when the worker’s lack of labour and other protections
is thought to strengthen their case for being taxed as an independent contractor (the Wolf
scenario).
I can see two possible strategies for minimizing any potential spillover effect in
tax law. The first would be to adopt a modest reform that expands labour standards
coverage only slightly, in hopes of avoiding any impact on tax affairs. The second and I
think preferable course would be to implement a more ambitious reform that clearly
differentiates the two legislative regimes. The latter approach would be more likely to
reduce any potential for friction or confusion between these two areas of regulation. A
new definition that departed clearly from that used in tax law could help to distinguish
the purposes and intended scope of the two regimes, and hence increase the acceptability
of certain workers maintaining a different status under each. It is notable that in both
Dynamex and 509023 Alberta Ltd. the Courts were faced with an individual claiming
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different status under legislative schemes that on their face used the same legal concept of
“employment”. The appearance of inconsistency would likely be reduced if the statutes
used different terminology and concepts to define their respective coverage. For this
purpose the “dependent contractor” or “quasi-subordinate worker” would be more
attractive options than the UK definition, for reasons discussed above.

(ii) If minimum labour standards are extended to new workers and firms, I speculate that
some may ultimately adapt their labour contracts and practices to better reflect those
legislative standards. For instance if a contractor becomes entitled to receive minimum
wage and vacation pay, might some firms (or workers) become more vigilant about
keeping accurate records of work time, or integrate that person more formally into the
firm’s regular payroll processes? Or, if certain contractors can only be dismissed for
cause or with sufficient notice, might they be subject to greater monitoring and reporting
expectations? To the extent that these behavioural changes align the working relationship
more closely with employment as traditionally understood, this may result inadvertently
in a change of character for tax purposes. In communicating with the public about any
labour standards reform that may be implemented it would be advisable, then, to include
information about possible tax implications of altering labour contracts or practices. It is
also possible for taxpayers to obtain advance rulings from the CRA to confirm what if
any tax consequences will ensue from any planned restructuring of workplace practices
or contractual terms.

(iii) This Report has observed that the character of many working relationships for tax
purposes is ambiguous, and this is confirmed by the vast amount of litigation on this
issue.

In many cases taxpayers take a position for filing purposes that may be legally

reasonable but which could be challenged if CRA decided to conduct an audit. Although
CRA is not directly involved in administering the Code, labour standards reform could
lead indirectly to closer scrutiny of certain taxpayers’ affairs and increased enforcement
activity. For example workers who enjoy the protection of Part III of the Code might be
more likely to assume they can claim Employment Insurance benefits on termination of a
job. As the agency responsible for administering the EI, CPP, GST and federal and
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provincial income tax systems, CRA will have information as to whether EI premiums
have been paid on behalf of particular workers, and whether they have in the past
reported their income as employees or independent contractors. An investigation of an
individual worker may then lead to a payroll audit of the hirer, in which CRA may
examine the characterization of other workers. Given the fuzziness of the distinction
between employment and self-employment in tax law, workers and hirers could be open
to challenge on past reporting practices that were legally defensible but not clearly
correct.
It is difficult to quantify this risk as it depends on the practical interactions among
various regulatory systems, citizens and government personnel.
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